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ABSTRACT This paper discusses malware detection in personal computers. Current malware detection 
solutions are static. Antiviruses rely on lists of malicious signatures that are then used in file scanning. 
These antiviruses are also very dependent on the operating system, requiring different solutions for different 
systems. This paper presents a solution that detects malware based on runtime attributes. It also emphasizes 
that these attributes are easily accessible and fairly generic meaning that it functions across systems and 
without specialized information. The attributes are used in a machine learning system that makes it flexible 
for retraining if necessary, but capable of handling new variants without needing to modify the solution. It 
can also be run quickly which allows for detection to be achieved before the malware gets too far. 
INDEX TERMS Malware, Machine Learning 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Malware is a large problem in modern technology. It causes 
many issues for people individually, as well as companies. 
This becomes more of an issue when you take into account 
the fact that malware is constantly evolving. As can be 
imagined, this makes it an incredibly difficult problem to 
solve. Antivirus hasn’t changed much at all over the past 20 
years for this reason. The solutions we employ are still 
fairly static. They rely on the antivirus publisher collecting 
samples continuously. These samples have to be analyzed 
to generate a signature that can then be used in detection. 
This is challenging for antivirus developers because they 
have to find ways of obtaining these samples and they have 
to invest resources in analyzing them.  The signatures 
obtained have to be added to a list that is pushed to clients. 
From a client’s perspective this means constant updates and 
slow response to new malware variants. 
When new malware strains are introduced or the 
malware is obfuscated the antivirus becomes completely 
ineffective. This leaves clients vulnerable to attacks, maybe 
even more so than without the antivirus because they 
assume it will keep them safe. 
This is where the solution I am proposing comes into 
play. It seems self-evident that malware should be 
detectable based on runtime attributes. These would be 
aspects of malware that on some high level would never 
change.  
The other issue that this paper aims to solve is that 
antivirus is effectively in itself malware that requires itself 
to be tightly coupled with the machine and incredibly 
specialized. This means that it needs to be designed 
specifically for each operating system and requires a large 
amount of information to function. 
What this paper proposes is a dynamic model that utilizes 
easily accessible runtime attributes in a generalizable way 
such that it can be extended between operating systems. 
These attributes are correlated in a statistically meaningful 
way by using machine learning. 
In this paper, I will outline what previous research has 
been done in this area. I will then detail the proposed 
solution after which the testing implementation will be laid 
out. There will then be discussion on the results of these 
tests. Lastly, the accomplishments of this paper and ideas 
for future work in this area will be summarized. 
II.  PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
It is quickly becoming common knowledge that existing 
antivirus solutions are inadequate. There are even articles 
appearing in common technical magazines outlining the idea 
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of changing from static analysis methods to dynamic 
methods [1]. The technical ideas supporting this change of 
thought are slightly sparser and this is due to the technical 
challenge involved in implementation. This is due to the fact 
that antivirus must be incredibly accurate and minimize false 
positives. This works in favor of static analysis, which will 
only positively flag malware if it is an exact match for known 
malware. Dynamic systems will always have more false 
positives since they are dependent on behavior that cannot be 
hard coded. 
There are a few dynamic solutions that have been 
proposed, but none of them match the criteria I have outlined 
here.  
Liu et al. [2] proposed an algorithm that takes into account 
malware behavior features and outputs a judgment based on 
these features. This doesn’t utilize a machine learning model 
as they created a custom predictor. The solution they 
proposed is also tied into Windows and requires low level 
information from the operating system. 
Wijnands [5] also proposed a very similar algorithm taking 
into account malware behavior features such as filesystem, 
registry, process creation/exiting, and thread creation/exiting. 
This compared feature sets by utilizing a matrix to calculate 
distance between nodes. This was also tied in with Windows. 
Aubrey-Jones [3] suggests intercepting API calls or using 
a virtualized environment to capture low level calls. 
Unfortunately, this only suggests a concept and provides no 
implementation or proof of concept. 
Tobiyama et al. [4] builds on this concept of intercepting 
API calls and adds the idea of using a Markov chain to 
construct behavior patterns for processes. These behavior 
patterns can then be labeled as malicious or benign. This 
also, only works on Windows, however. Xie et al. [6] also 
proposes using a Markov chain detection method, but this 
implementation is based on user behavior/interaction so that 
it can determine anomalous behavior. This implementation is 
specific to Android systems though. 
Shahzad et al. [7] uses low level process information such 
as page frames and context switches along with more general 
information like launcher size. This implementation is 
specific to Linux. 
Ferrante et al. [8] suggests using system calls as well as 
CPU and memory usage. This is more similar to the attribute 
set that is used in the solution proposed in this paper, but still 
requires low level attributes, has a fairly limited number of 
features and is specific to Android. 
Gheorghe et al. [9] is very similar in that it also utilizes 
CPU and memory usage, but instead of system calls, it uses 
system settings such as WiFi enabling/disabling and 
Bluetooth enabling/disabling. As can be surmised, this 
couples it to the operating system again - Android in this 
case. 
Milosevic et al. [10] is effectively the same attribute set 
that is used in this paper and does, in fact, use much of the 
same analysis process. The notable difference is that their 
solution is tied to Android. 
It is quite noticeable that the implementations in existence 
currently are very low level and require a tight knit coupling 
with the specific operating system in use. The solution 
proposed here is similar to most of these solutions, but 
significantly more generalized. 
III.  SOLUTION 
Based on the problem statement outlined in the introduction, 
the solution that is being proposed here is a machine learning 
model that utilizes process statistics to flag malicious 
programs. The process statistics that are being utilized are 
similar to what would come from a “top” or “ps” command 
on a Unix based system. 
Since the goal of this system is to be cross platform, it is 
important that the method of obtaining these process statistics 
is easily portable. With this in mind, a program call SIGAR 
[11] was selected. This is a Java library that captures process 
information using a DLL or shared object library file. The list 
of operating systems this supports is shown in Figure 1. 
While it is not completely universal, it is close and could be 
extended to support other operating systems as needed.  
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This library is used in a script that outputs to either the 
terminal or a text file about all process information it can 
capture as frequently as possible. Note that this means that 
benign and malicious processes are both logged to the same 
file since all processes are captured. The features that are 
captured are shown in Table 1. 
These features and the classification are organized in a flat 
text CSV file in entries like the following: 
 
29736960, 5009408, -1, -1, -1, 1635, -1, -1, -1, '-1', 117, 8, 'R', -1, 'WmiPrvSE', 'clean' 
67579904, 5136384, -1, -1, -1, 2236, 0.0, 187, 156, 
'C:\Users\michael\AppData\Roaming\sktoeys.exe', 57, 2, 'R', 187, 
'C:\Users\michael\AppData\Roaming\sktoeys.exe', 'infected' 
1441792, 233472, -1, -1, -1, 12491, -1, -1, -1, '-1', 328, 65, 'R', -1, 'System', 'clean' 
These CSV files are then mapped to ARFF files and the 
malicious data labeled using the identified malicious EXE 
with string attributes removed. The reason that string 
attributes are removed is that they limit the number of model 
types that can be used and don’t really provide any 
meaningful data unless parsed for specific pieces of content. 
For the purposes of this paper, it was unnecessary to keep 
this information, but could potentially be used in future 
implementations. ARFF files are the proprietary data format 
of the machine learning library WEKA [12]. This was chosen 
here due to its simplicity of implementation, vast feature 
selection, and data visualization tools. 
TABLE I 
SIGAR PROCESS ATTRIBUTE LIST [11] 
Attribute Type Description 
pid  STRING Process ID 
mem_size NUMERIC Total process virtual 
memory 
mem_resident NUMERIC Total process 
resident memory 
mem_share  NUMERIC Total process shared 
memory 
mem_minor_faults  NUMERIC Non I/O page faults 
mem_major_faults NUMERIC I/O page faults 
mem_page_faults NUMERIC Total number of 
page faults 
cpu_percent  NUMERIC Process cpu usage 
cpu_total  NUMERIC Process cpu time 
(sum of user and 
kernel time) 
cpu_system NUMERIC Process cpu time 
(kernel time) 
proc_name STRING Name of process 
executable 
proc_file_descriptors  NUMERIC Total number of 
open file descriptors 
proc_threads  NUMERIC Number of active 
threads 
proc_state STRING Process state 
(Running, Zombie, 
etc.) 
proc_time NUMERIC Process cpu time 
(sum of user and 
kernel) 
Once a model is generated, it can be used in correlation 
with the script that captures data to classify processes as 
malicious or not.  
IV.  TESTING IMPLEMENTATION 
There were three steps in setting up the testing for this. These 
were the selection of datasets, features, and machine learning 
model types. 
A.  DATASETS 
For testing purposes there were a few malware instances 
from theZoo malware database [13] whose runtime attributes 
were sampled. Note that these datasets include both benign 
and malicious data even though they are the dataset for a 
specific malware, but that they are labeled benign/malicious 
appropriately. There was also a large dataset of just clean 
data for false positive testing. These are all listed in Table 2. 
Once the data was collected it was segregated into 4 
training and 4 testing sets.  
FIGURE 1.  List of possible SIGAR library files by operating system. 
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TABLE 2 
DATASETS 
Malware Name Malicious EXE Malware Type Number of Data Entries 
Waski.Upatre utilview.exe Trojan 23,150 malicious, 1,523,816 clean 
Win32.Alina.3.4.B jucheck.exe Trojan 13,047 malicious, 881,478 clean 
EquationDrug EquationDrug_4556CE5EB007AF1DE5BD3B457F0B2
16D.exe 
Trojan  769 malicious, 10,936,625 clean 
ZeusVM dwm.exe Botnet 11,473 malicious, 1,203,780 clean 
IllusionBot BOTBINARY.EXE Botnet 249,050 malicious, 14,292,470 clean 
Teslacrypt sktoeys.exe Ransomware 53 malicious, 2,247 clean 
Jigsaw drpbx.exe Ransomware 114 malicious, 4,562 clean 
Locky svchost.exe Ransomware 80 malicious, 4,525 clean 
Clean  Clean Data 12,093,240 clean 
The first set was for Trojan testing. For this, the 
Waski.Upatre and Win32.Alina.3.4.B datasets were used for 
training and the EquationDrug dataset was used for testing. 
The second set was for botnet testing. For this, the 
IllusionBot dataset was used for training and the ZeusVM 
dataset was used for testing. 
The third set was for ransomware testing. For this, the 
Jigsaw and Locky datasets were used for training and the 
Teslacrypt dataset was used for testing. 
The last set was an aggregation of all of these malware 
variants and used combined training and testing sets. In other 
words, the training dataset was Waski.Upatre, 
Win32.Alina.3.4.B, IllusionBot, Jigsaw, and Locky. The 
testing dataset consisted of EquationDrug, ZeusVM, 
Teslacrypt, and the purely clean data. 
B.  FEATURE SELECTION 
Three feature selection algorithms in Weka were used to 
determine which of the acquired process attributes should be 
used in model training and testing. The algorithms used were 
CfsSubsetEval, CorrelationAttributeEval, and 
InfoGainAttributeEval. 
1)  CFSSUBSETEVAL 
This is a means of evaluating the value of a subset of 
attributes by comparing the value of an attribute with how 
redundant it is with other attributes in the subset. It utilized 
BestFirst which searches via greedy hillclimbing with 
backtracking. 
2)  CORRELATIONATTRIBUTEEVAL 
This picks the most relevant attributes based on how likely a 
class is for that specific variable. This utilized Ranker which 
simply organizes by the highest values achieved by attribute 
evaluators such as entropy. 
3)  INFOGAINATTRIBUTEEVAL 
This evaluates an attribute based on how much class 
information is gained from it. This also utilized Ranker. 
4)  FINAL FEATURES 
After running the above feature selection algorithms, the 
attribute rankings and what they represented were used to 
construct a list of the most valuable attributes for each of the 
4 test datasets. 
The attributes chosen were as follows: 
 Trojan datasets:  
o mem_size 
o mem_resident 
o proc_file_descriptors 
o proc_threads 
 Botnet datasets:  
o mem_page_faults 
o mem_size 
o proc_file_descriptors 
o proc_threads 
 Ransomware datasets:  
o proc_file_descriptors 
o mem_resident 
o mem_size 
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 Aggregate datasets:  
o proc_file_descriptors 
o mem_size 
o mem_resident 
o mem_page_faults 
C.  MODELS 
There were six Weka machine learning models chosen for 
testing. These are as follows: 
 Decision Table 
o This is a simple Decision Table majority 
classifier. It utilizes a grid to map features 
to the likeliest classification. 
 Logistic 
o This is a Logistic Regression model which 
includes a ridge estimator. 
 NaiveBayes  
o This is a NaiveBayes implementation 
using estimator classes. The estimator uses 
a precision that is based on the input data. 
 PART 
o This is a decision list based on tree data. 
Effectively it constructs partial C4.5 
decision trees and makes the best leaf from 
each into a rule in the list. 
 REPTree 
o This is a fast regression tree that uses 
information gain for tree derivation and is 
pruned. It sorts the attributes once and if 
anything needs to be added splits existing 
instances. 
 Voted Perceptron 
o This is a voting system where weight 
vectors are used with a set number of 
nodes to vote on data. This is supposed to 
be similar to SVM except faster. 
For all of these models, the default parameters specified in 
Weka were used, except for Voted Perceptron where the 
number of nodes was changed from 10000 to 3000. 
V. RESULTS 
First each training set was used to create each of the 6 
classifiers. Each of these classifiers was evaluated in two 
ways, using 10 fold cross validation and via the test dataset 
outlined previously.  
A.  10 FOLD CROSS VALIDATION RESULTS 
When the classifier was being made, 10 fold cross validation 
was performed. This means that the data is split into 10 
pieces and for each of those pieces one piece is used for 
testing while the other 9 are used for training. This generated 
the results outlined in Figures 2 - 25. 
1)  TROJAN 
As can be seen in Figures 2 - 7, the Decision Table, 
NaiveBayes, PART, and REPTree perform about equally and 
have near perfect accuracy. 
2)  BOTNET 
As can be seen in Figures 8 - 13, all of the classifiers have 
near perfect accuracy with the exception of Voted 
Perceptron. 
3)  RANSOMWARE 
According to Figures 14 - 19, the Decision Table, PART, and 
REPTree have near perfect accuracy and the NaiveBayes and 
Logistic have moderate performance. 
4)  COMBINED 
As can be seen in Figures 20 - 25, the Decision Table, PART, 
and REPTree perform extremely well. The NaiveBayes also 
performs fairly well, but has an increased false positive rate. 
5)  EVALUATION 
This shows that the classifiers would work for moderately 
similar data, but are at least fairly extensible. The only 
consistently bad classifier was the Voted Perceptron which 
consistently missed identification of malware. 
B.  TEST RESULTS 
The next step then was to analyze completely unseen 
malware samples’ runtime attributes. This was where the 
classifiers just generated were then tested using the test data 
outlined in the previous section. The results of this are shown 
in Figures 26 - 49. 
1)  TROJAN 
As can be seen in Figures 26- 31, none of the classifiers 
correctly identify a single malware sample. 
2)  BOTNET 
This demonstrates that the logistic classifier at least starts to 
identify the malicious samples as shown in Figure 33. Even 
so, it only classifies a small portion of the samples and all of 
the other classifiers fail completely in malicious 
identification as shown in Figures 32 - 37.
6 
 
FIGURE 2.  Trojan, 
Decision Table, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
 
FIGURE 3.  Trojan, 
Logistic, 10 Fold 
Cross Validation 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 4.  Trojan, 
NaiveBayes, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
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FIGURE 5.  Trojan, 
PART, 10 Fold 
Cross Validation 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 6.  Trojan, 
REPTree, 10 Fold 
Cross Validation 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 7.  Trojan, 
Voted Perceptron, 
10 Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
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FIGURE 8.  Botnet, 
Decision Table, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
FIGURE 9.  Botnet, 
Logistic, 10 Fold 
Cross Validation 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 10.  
Botnet, 
NaiveBayes, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
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FIGURE 11.  
Botnet, PART, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
 
FIGURE 12.  
Botnet, REPTree, 
10 Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
 
FIGURE 13.  
Botnet, Voted 
Perceptron, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
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FIGURE 14.  
Ransomware, 
Decision Table, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
 
FIGURE 15.  
Ransomware, 
Logistic, 10 Fold 
Cross Validation 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 16.  
Ransomware, 
NaiveBayes, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
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FIGURE 17.  
Ransomware, 
PART, 10 Fold 
Cross Validation 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 18.  
Ransomware, 
REPTree, 10 Fold 
Cross Validation 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 19.  
Ransomware, 
Voted Perceptron, 
10 Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
 
12 
 
FIGURE 20.  
Combined, 
Decision Table, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
 
FIGURE 21.  
Combined, 
Logistic, 10 Fold 
Cross Validation 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 22.  
Combined, 
NaiveBayes, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
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FIGURE 23.  
Combined, PART, 
10 Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
 
FIGURE 24.  
Combined, 
REPTree, 10 Fold 
Cross Validation 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 25.  
Combined, Voted 
Perceptron, 10 
Fold Cross 
Validation Results. 
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FIGURE 26.  
Trojan, Decision 
Table, Testing 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 27.  
Trojan, Logistic, 
Testing Results. 
 
FIGURE 28.  
Trojan, 
NaiveBayes, 
Testing Results. 
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FIGURE 29.  
Trojan, PART, 
Testing Results. 
 
FIGURE 30.  
Trojan, REPTree, 
Testing Results. 
 
FIGURE 31.  
Trojan, Voted 
Perceptron, 
Testing Results. 
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FIGURE 32.  
Botnet, Decision 
Table, Testing 
Results. 
FIGURE 33.  
Botnet, Logistic, 
Testing Results. 
 
FIGURE 34.  
Botnet, 
NaiveBayes, 
Testing Results. 
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FIGURE 35.  
Botnet, PART, 
Testing Results. 
 
FIGURE 36.  
Botnet, REPTree, 
Testing Results. 
 
FIGURE 37.  
Botnet, Voted 
Perceptron, 
Testing Results. 
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FIGURE 38.  
Ransomware, 
Decision Table, 
Testing Results. 
 
FIGURE 39.  
Ransomware, 
Logistic, Testing 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 40.  
Ransomware, 
NaiveBayes, 
Testing Results. 
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FIGURE 41.  
Ransomware, 
PART, Testing 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 42.  
Ransomware, 
REPTree, Testing 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 43.  
Ransomware, 
Voted Perceptron, 
Testing Results. 
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FIGURE 44.  
Combined, 
Decision Table, 
Testing Results. 
 
FIGURE 45.  
Combined, 
Logistic, Testing 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 46.  
Combined, 
NaiveBayes, 
Testing Results. 
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FIGURE 47.  
Combined, PART, 
Testing Results. 
 
FIGURE 48.  
Combined, 
REPTree, Testing 
Results. 
 
FIGURE 49.  
Combined, Voted 
Perceptron, 
Testing Results. 
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3)  RANSOMWARE 
As can be seen in Figures 38 - 43, none of the classifiers 
correctly identify a single malware sample. 
4)  COMBINED 
As shown in Figures 44 - 49, the combined data models start 
to correctly classify samples. In particular the PART and 
REPTree models perform very well with a relatively small 
number of false positives. The NaïveBayes and Decision 
Table perform reasonably as well. 
5)  EVALUATION 
The test datasets provide an interesting outcome. You’ll note 
that these performed incredibly poorly except for the 
combined dataset which succeeded with certain classifiers. 
This seems to be due to the lower amounts of data in the 
training sets. Since there is less data, there is less process 
diversity. This process diversity does not seem to be related 
to malware types, e.g. botnets, ransomware, or trojans, either. 
It seems that malware tends to share traits across families and 
variants and training across these spreads provides a level of 
robustness to the system that is demonstrated in the 
combined data testing. 
 Note that the important factor here is low false positives. 
The malicious samples are repeatedly taken which means 
that even if a malware process is missed the first time, it can 
be caught in the future. This means that even if the rate of 
flagging malware correctly is low, it doesn’t mean that it 
wouldn’t perform well in practice as long as its false positive 
rate is low. 
Another point to make is that over the course of the testing 
there were two models that performed consistently better 
than the other models. These were the PART and REPTree 
classifiers. It is worth noting that these are both tree based 
classifiers which shows that trees can be used for simple 
identification of malicious process attributes. The other win 
here is that trees are fairly efficient meaning that in an 
identification system, they would not add much overhead. 
C.  PERFORMANCE 
The last point to address here is the speed performance. The 
process monitor script was run on an Intel Core i7-6700k 
4GHz processor. The machine was running 385 processes 
and the average time to iterate over all of these processes in 
the script was 24.748 seconds. This means that the overhead 
to run the process capture script is roughly 64 ms per process 
running on a given machine. This would of course be added 
to the amount of time necessary to classify a given instance. 
This would be dependent on the machine learning algorithm 
chosen, but would be fairly insignificant. This means that this 
system could be run repeatedly and quite frequently to ensure 
that malware is caught almost immediately upon entering a 
system. 
In addition, the models themselves are anywhere from 2 to 
10 kilobytes meaning that the memory needed to use them 
for classification is fairly low. This means that it could be run 
on low memory systems as well. 
VI. SUMMARY 
This section provides a brief summary of what was 
accomplished in this paper. First, a system was proposed that 
allows for cross platform evaluation of malicious process 
behavior. While this was tested on a Windows system, the 
solution only relies on a system’s ability to support the 
process statistics gathering library SIGAR and Java, both of 
which are widely supported. The malware flagging system is 
also fairly low power and can be run as often as needed so it 
can be run more frequently to catch malware more quickly or 
can be run less frequently for better performance which 
would allow it to work on IOT and Android devices as well 
as personal computers. 
The second contribution was that it evaluated multiple 
machine learning models on 4 different datasets and showed 
which models performed the best. This demonstration 
showed that tree based models seem to provide the most 
accurate classification method for this data. 
It also showed that this identification could be performed 
quickly and efficiently. Due to the statistics being gathered 
being fairly accessible and the simplicity of the solution, it 
doesn’t cause a large amount of overhead on the system. This 
means that the classification can be done as often as needed. 
Lastly, it showed that having malicious data spread across 
different variants and families provides a robust system 
capable of flagging a wide variety of malware. This was 
shown based on the inaccuracy of the classifiers when used 
on individual malware families when compared with the 
success of the classifiers when trained on cross family 
malware datasets and evaluated on diverse variants. It also 
had fairly low false positive rates indicating that the attributes 
chosen in the data were fairly indicative of malicious 
processes and had little overfitting. 
VII. FUTURE WORK 
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A few ideas will now be proposed for how to increase the 
effectiveness of this malware detection system.  
The first is taking into account some standard telltale signs 
of malware. For instance, malware is typically installed to the 
“AppData” or “tmp” folder and provides a decent estimator 
of malicious behavior. It was not included in this 
implementation since it is operating system specific. That 
said it could be used in future implementations by simply 
checking a variety of different common malware installation 
folder paths. Another example would be utilizing processes’ 
tree structures. Malware typically spins off multiple 
processes to accomplish its goals so using the tree structure 
as part of the input to the classifier may help. Both these and 
other signs could be used as part of the dataset that the model 
is trained on to increase accuracy. 
The second improvement that could be made is the usage 
of behavior over time. This system simply checks a process’ 
statistics at a given time. This could be made significantly 
more robust by taking multiple samples for regression 
classification. This modifies the machine learning to account 
for time. Another possible implementation of time based 
behavior identification that wouldn’t require modification of 
the existing classifier would be to check for sequential flags 
on a process. In other words, if a process is flagged as 
malicious by the model multiple times in succession, there is 
a high likelihood of it being malicious. This modification of 
the system would reduce the likelihood of false positives. 
This could be used to balance false positives with malware 
identification. 
Lastly, this paper was designed on the prospect of making 
adaptable dynamic systems that are cross platform 
compatible. The reality, though, is that most platforms 
already have static systems in place. It might be beneficial to 
tie into these systems and leverage their abilities with the 
strengths of a dynamic system. The dynamic system could 
also be used to find potentially malicious processes to send 
samples of to the antivirus manufacturer for addition to the 
malware signature list. This would be a means of obtaining a 
large number of malicious samples that would take less time 
to process due to the high malicious classification accuracy 
of the dynamic system. 
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